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conduct amounts to bad faith has been a rather broad one."5 Hence the
approach of the court in the different cases varies with the particular
circumstances of each. This of course furnishes no guide as to what
will or will not be good faith bargaining in that vast area beyond
flat refusal to negotiate in the first instance. The White decision shows
that the good faith test, although codified by Taft-Hartley into the
National Labor Relations Act, still retains the indefiniteness of §8
(a) (5)16 of the original act. Since, however, it appears that the
existence of good faith can only be determined by an objective evaluation of all of the acts and circumstances in each case, in order to
ascertain the purpose or subjective intention of the parties, 17 the inadvisability of a more specific rule seems apparent.
The decision in the White case,' 8 under the application of the good
faith test, seems to be a well-considered one, which is in conformity
with the statutory recognition of the non-concession privilege and the
Congressional intent that the terms of the agreement be left to the
parties, and not to governmental supervision. However, in finding no
fault with the insistence on a management function clause under §8(d),
the court did caution:
"We do not hold that under no possible circumstances can
the mere content of the various proposals and counterproposals
of management and union be sufficient evidence of a want of
good faith to justify a holding to that effect. We can conceive
of one party to such bargaining procedure suggesting proposals
of such a nature or type or couched in such objectionable language that they would be calculated to disrupt any serious
negotiations.

"19

ROBERT J. URBAN

Federal Income Taxation-Tax Accounting-Effect of Events
Occurring After The Close of The Taxable Year On An Accrual
Taxpayer's Deductions-A corporate taxpayer on the accrual basis
accrued on its books on July 1, 1945 a capital stock tax which was
payable June 30, 1946. At the close of its fiscal year on August 31,
1945 an independent accounting firm audited the taxpayer's books for
the purpose of reports to stockholders, reports to creditor banks and
as a basis for filing tax returns. This audit was completed on October
30, 1945. On November 8, 1945, the capital stock tax was repealed.
The taxpayer, after obtaining extensions, filed its tax returns on Janu25 See e.g., J. I. Case, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 253 F. 2d 149 (7th Cir. March 12, 1958) :
"Particular circumstances in each case must be considered in determining
whether statutory obligations of the employer to bargain in good faith has
been met."
16 29 U.S.C.A. §158 (a) (5).
17 See Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 585.
is White's Uvalde Mines v. N.L.R.B., supra note 5.
19 White's Uvalde Mines v. N.L.R.B., supra note 5, at 2005.
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ary 15, 1946, taking the accrued capital stock tax as a deduction for its
1945 fiscal year. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and
assessed a deficiency. The taxpayer, after satisfying the deficiency,
brought this suit for a refund in the Federal District Court. HELD,
inter alia, the taxpayer was not required to reopen its books and eliminate the deduction for capital stock taxes but could file its return on
January 15, 1946 showing a deduction for the accrued tax, although it
would never be paid. Rahr Malting Co. v. United States 157 F. Supp.
803 (E.D. Wis. 1957), now on appeal to the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The decision in the present case is based on the authority of a
series of cases which holds that a taxpayer who has correctly accrued a tax and taken a deduction on one year's return need not thereafter file an amended return to reflect events occurring after the close
of its taxable year.
In Van Norman Co. v. Welch,' the taxpayer accrued a Massachusetts' excise tax for 1935 and took the amount as a deduction
against 1935 income on a return filed March 15, 1936. In June of 1936
a law was passed increasing the excise tax rate 10%. This law was
retroactive to 1935. The Commissioner claimed that the taxpayer
should have readjusted its accrual for 1935 and taken the deduction for
the extra 10% in that year. The court held that the event which fixed
the amount of the extra tax and made the taxpayer liable to pay it did
not occur until June of 1936, so it was a proper deduction for 1936
and the taxpayer need not go back and include it in its deduction for
1935.
In United States v. Detroit Moulding Co. 2 the taxpayer filed its return on March 15, 1938 claiming a deduction for an accrued capital
stock tax of $7885 for 1937. On May 27, 1938 a new capital stock tax
law was passed which allowed the taxpayer to lower its capital stock
valuation and thereby decrease its capital stock tax liability for 1937
to $1500. The Commissioner denied the full deduction taken for the
year 1937 and assessed a deficiency. In a suit for a refund of the deficiency the court held that the accrual of the tax was correct at the
end of the taxpayer's tax year and the deduction was proper. The
change should be reflected by crediting the amount by which the obligation was lessened as income for the 1938 tax year.3
These cases appear to be in accord with the "annual accounting
concept" under which income taxes are assessed on the basis of annual returns showing the net result of all the taxpayer's transactions
1141 F. 2nd 99 (1st Cir. 1944)

256 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Mich. 1944)
3 See also Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 577
(N.D. Iowa 1949) which involves an almost identical fact situation.
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during the fixed accounting period.' The result of this rule is to deny
both to the government and to the taxpayer the privilege of allocating
income or deductions to years other than the year in which it is properly accrued. 5 The test laid down by the Supreme Court is of the United
States as to when a deduction is to be accrued is the "all events test."
This test requires that all events which determine the amount of the
obligation and the taxpayers liability to pay must occur in the taxable
year in which the deduction is taken.6
In United States v. Anderson,7 the court held that a tax on profits
from sales of munitions in the taxable year of 1916 must be taken as
a deduction against 1916 income even though it was not assessed and
due until 1917, because all the events which determined the amount of
the tax and the liability to pay it had occurred in 1916.8
Applying these rules to the principal case, it seems clear that at the
end of the taxpayer's fiscal year in August of 1945 all of the events
had occurred which made it liable for the capital stock tax and the tax
was definite in amount. Therefore, the tax had accrued and was a
proper deduction for 1945, in order to clearly reflect income for that
year, even though the tax was never actually paid.
It would therefore seem safe to say that when a tax is properly
accrued, according to recognized accounting procedures, events which
occur after the close of the tax year need not be taken into account in
determining the tax liability for the year.
However, there is one limitation to this general statement. This
exception stems from the rule of Fawcus Machine Co. v. United
States.9 In the Fawcus Case the taxpayer accrued excess profits taxes
imposed by the Revenue Act of 1917 in a reserve for its taxable year
of 1918; however, it failed to deduct this amount from its 1918 income. The Commissioner claimed that the deduction should have been
taken in 1918. The taxpayer claimed that the tax did not accrue until
it was assessed and paid. The court, following the rule laid down in
the Anderson Case,10 held that the tax must be accrued as a liability
for the current year's business, even though it is not due until the
next year. The taxpayer then contended that the tax could not accrue
in 1918, since a retroactive tax law was passed in February of 1919
which increased the rates and therefore the amount of its liability was
4 Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
5 Security Flour Mills v. United States, 321 U.S. 281 (1944) and Baltimore
Transfer Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1 (1947).
6 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1925).
Ibid.
s See 21 CHicAGo LAW REVIEW 293 (1954) for a discussion of the "all events
tcst."
P 282 U.S. 375 (1930).
10 Supra, note 6.
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not definite at the close of its 1918 tax year. In answer to this contention the court said:
"But the Act of 1917 was in force and required the same
sort of taxes, and petitioner concedes it accrued its taxes for
1918 and set them up in reserve at the end of the year. The
Act of 1919 was retroactive and replaced the prior Act of
October 3, 1917 and the taxpayer understood that the policy of
the United States with respect to income and excess profits
taxes was continuous. . . . The taxes in questions were provided for by an act passed in February, 1919 but they were for
the year 1918. The act was passed in ample time to allow the
taxpayer to readjust its accounts for that year by including
these taxes; and, since its books were kept on an accrual basis,
it was necessary that this should be done in order to clearly
reflect income for 1918." 11
The result reached in the Fawcus Case appears to be inconsistent
with the "annual accounting concept" and the "all events test". Although there was a definite liability under the 1917 act, the amount
of liability imposed by the 1919 act was not fixed until the latter was
passed. Therefore, it would appear that this amount was not definite
at the close of the taxpayer's 1918 tax year and did not become
definite until a month after the close of the tax year of 1918. However, the court held that the tax was definite under the Act of 1917
at the close of the tax year and therefore was a proper accrual for
1918, and since the taxpayer should have anticipated the change in
the tax law occurring within a reasonable time after the close of its
fiscal year, it should have readjusted its accrual of the tax under the
Act of 1917 to clearly reflect income for 1918.
Apparently, the court was of the opinion, in the Fawcus Case,
that if an event can be anticipated as occurring within a reasonable
time after the close of the tax year, it should be taken into account in
computing the tax for that year. In other words, if an event which
fixes the amount of the obligation can be reasonably anticipated as
occurring within a reasonable time after the close of the tax year, it
should be treated as if it had occurred at the end of the tax year.
This contention is borne out by the fact that subsequent cases interpret Fawcus as having turned on the fact that the taxpayer should2
have anticipated the event which fixed the amount of its liability.'
In the Detroit Mouding Case, 3 the court did not require the taxpayer
to readjust its accrual for a past year to reflect a change caused by
an event which occurred about five months after the close of the taxpayer's tax year. The court in the Detroit Moulding Case based its
:12 Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1930).
1 Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237 (1941), and Rahr Malting Co. v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Wis. 1957).
3 Supra, note 2.
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decision on the fact that the event was unexpected at the close of the
taxpayer's tax year.
In summary then, it would appear that when a taxpayer on the
accrual basis has correctly accrued an item according to recognized
accounting procedures and has filed its return on that basis, it need
not readjust that return to account for changes due to events occurring
after the close of its fiscal year unless it could reasonably anticipate
those events occurring within a reasonable time after the close of its
fiscal year. In cases where an event can reasonably be anticipated,
the taxpayer must hold his books open for a reasonable time in order
to readjust, or else it will be required to reopen its books, if already
closed, to adjust for the change.
The principal case extends this rule so as to allow an accrual taxpayer who has correctly accrued an item and closed its books but has
not yet filed its tax return, to go ahead and file its tax returns on that
basis even though an event has occurred after the close of its fiscal
year which changes its tax liability; providing the event could not
reasonably have been anticipated and it would be unreasonable to require the taxpayer to reopen its books for the past year and readjust
them.
In these cases the proper procedure is to adjust for the change
on the next year's return. However, if an item is incorrectly accrued
the proper procedure is to go back to the year in which the mistake
was made and file an amended return for that year.14 The theory
being: an erroneous reporting of income because of a mistake in a
prior year does not authorize an erroneous reporting in a subsequent
year in order to adjust for the prior mistake.15
ROBERT WATSON

Defenses To A Charge of Offering Services and Facilities To
Customers in Violation of The Robinson-Patman Act-Petitioner,
a corporation, was charged by the FTC with violation of Sec. 2 (e)
of the Robinson-Patman Act' in that it gave services and facilities to
customers on a discriminatory basis (other than a "proportionally
equal" basis). Petitioner sells patterns for women's dresses. Its principal customers are of two types: "fabric" shops and "Red Front"
stores. The "fabric" shops sell materials as their principal commodity
and offer patterns to their customers primarly as a service. Many make
14

§1A51

-

1 (a) and §1.461

1 (a) (3)

-

INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS (1958).

Escanaba and Lake Superior R. R. Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 412
(1931).
1This section provides: "(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser . . . by contracting

'5

to furnish or furnishing ...

any services or facilities .

.

. not accorded to all

purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S. C.
§13 (1952).

